On Internet discussion forums as well as in some books, there is a tendency to attribute very high number of kills to German tank units, as well as very high "kill ratios". This is especially true for the lists of German tank aces and the independent Tiger battalions. These high kill numbers are based on the claims of the German tank units, which are often accepted as accurate without criticism. When compared to the Allied losses in the same theater it is furthermore assumed that if the Allied losses approximately match the German tank units' claims, this is verification that the claims are accurate.

As will be demonstrated below, the reality was that the German units' claims were greatly exaggerated, and that the majority of Allied losses were not from German tanks or even armored vehicles in general.

The Cause of Tank Kills

Destroyed Tiger in North Africa with five kill rings.
Three 3,7 cm Pak anti-tank guns on the Eastern Front, each with seven kill rings.

Detailed descriptions of battles during the Second World War will often focus on tanks fighting other tanks. While this is easier to quantify, and no doubt sells more books, it does not reflect the usual conditions under which tanks were destroyed. Actual tank combat focused on breaking through the lines of the opposing forces using superiority of force while anti-tank gun and tank destroyer units destroyed the tanks of the opponent. This is evident from the fact that the usage of high-explosive tank gun ammunition exceeded that of anti-tank ammunition and that the destruction of anti-tank guns receiving as much emphasis in German unit reports as the destruction of tanks.

After the war, the British Army made a comprehensive investigation of the cause of their tank losses, analyzing the cause of destruction of 3710 tanks. The result of the survey is shown in the table below. As can be seen, tanks and self-propelled guns accounted for less than half of the surveyed losses. Since the numbers for tanks and self-propelled guns is approximately the same for all three theaters, it is reasonable to conclude that the numbers can be applied to the Western Front in general as well as the Eastern Front.

Survey of British tank losses during the Second World War.
Theater Tanks lost Mines Anti-tank guns Tanks Self-propelled guns Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck Other
Northwest Europe 1305 22.1% 22.7% 14.5% 24.4% 14.2% 2.1%
Italy 671 30.0% 16.0% 12.0% 26.0% 9.0% 7.0%
North Africa 1734 19.5% 40.3% 38.2% - - 2.0%
Average 3710 22.3% 29.8% 25.3% 13.5% 6.1% 3.0%

German High Command Opinion

The department responsible for estimating the Soviet Union's armor strength, Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East)Look up term, compiled statistics and estimations of Soviet armor production and losses. As part of their work it was necessary to estimate how actual Soviet losses compared to the claims submitted by field units.

The reduction changed over time. In a 1944 German High Command report on estimated Soviet tank and assault gun production and losses the following excerpt details how the German High Command attempted to adjust troop claims to achieve a statistically usable number.1

Tank Repairs

To account for counting errors and double counting, and for repairable tanks, the [Soviet] losses were reduced by 20 percent and 15 percent [respectively] from 1 December 1942 to 30 June 1943, and by a total of 50 percent from 1 July 1943.

Because the troops have identified a large number of repaired tanks, it is necessary to apply the 50 percent reduction retroactively for the [Soviet] losses since December 1942 to June 1943, thus reducing the [Soviet] losses for this period.

As the Red Army had intensified their salvaging of tanks it is still subject to further study whether the 50 percent reductions is sufficient.

Two things can be read from this excerpt; that the German high command was well aware that units over-claimed kills, and that the claims did not take into account that some of the destroyed tanks could be salvaged and repaired. That the reduction increased as Germany began their retreat makes sense, as the salvaging of lost tanks became much easier for the Soviet Army as they began taking back conquered territory. It is also clear that the German High Command was uncertain whether a reduction by 50 percent was sufficient.

This was not the only change to the reduction of unit claims. While the reduction for Luftwaffeair force
Look up term claims remained constant at 50 procent between July 1943 and December 1944, ArmyHeer
Look up term claims changed multiple times, as shown in the table below.

Changes to ArmyHeer
Look up term claim reduction rates. The reduction rates are shown in the estimated chronological sequence based on the contents of the documents.2345678
Month Reduction 1 Reduction 2 Reduction 3 Reduction 4
January 1942 20%
February 1942 20%
March 1942 20%
April 1942 20%
May 1942 20%
June 1942 20%
July 1942 20%
August 1942 20%
September 1942 20%
October 1942 20%
November 1942 20%
December 1942 35% 50%
January 1943 35% 50%
February 1943 35% 50%
March 1943 35% 50%
April 1943 35% 50%
May 1943 35% 50%
June 1943 35% 50%
July 1943 50% 50%
August 1943 50% 50%
September 1943 50% 50%
October 1943 50% 50%
November 1943 50% 50%
December 1943 50% 50%
January 1944 50% 50% 30% 20%
February 1944 50% 30% 20%
March 1944 50% 30% 20%
April 1944 50% 30% 20%
May 1944 30% 20%
June 1944 30% 20%
July 1944 50% 40%
August 1944 50% 40%
September 1944 30% 20%
October 1944 20%
November 1944 30% 20%
December 1944 20%

Soviet Armor Losses, 1941-1945

As mentioned above, unit claims were adjusted to account for double counting and repairs. In the table below is an aggregation of the unit claims and adjusted claims for tanks and assault guns, along with a comparison with the actual Soviet armor losses. For months where the adjustment was changed retroactively, only the latest figures are shown.

As can be seen, the yearly adjusted total is reasonably close to the actual Soviet losses. The adjusted 1943 claim is significantly lower than the actual losses. By contrast, the 1945 total is missing the April and May claims, which would likely have increased the total significantly beyond the actual losses. For every year, however, the unit claims are significantly higher than the actual losses.

Comparison of German unit claims, German Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East)Look up term adjusted claims, and actual Soviet losses of tanks and assault guns. The December 1942 to June 1943 Luftwaffeair force
Look up term claims are assumed to be troop claims but may be adjusted claims.91011121314151617
Month Units Adjusted Reduction Actual Overclaim
ArmyHeer
Look up term		 Luftwaffeair force
Look up term		 Total ArmyHeer
Look up term		 Luftwaffeair force
Look up term		 Total ArmyHeer
Look up term		 Luftwaffeair force
Look up term		 Units Adjusted
1941
Total 22 246 22 000 20 500 9% 7%
1942
January 550 440 20%
February 700 560 20%
March 950 760 20%
April 470 370 20%
May 1 788 1 430 20%
June 790 630 20%
July 4 071 3 260 20%
August 4 347 3 480 20%
September 2 982 2 310 20%
October 539 430 20%
November 1 296 1 040 20%
December 2 664 310 2 974 1 490 50%
Total 21 367 16 200 15 100 42% 7%
1943
January 1 680 156 1 836 920 50%
February 1 774 173 1 947 970 50%
March 1 783 295 2 078 1 040 50%
April 119 35 154 80 50%
May 176 30 206 100 50%
June 81 13 94 50 50%
July 7 300 1 008 8 308 3 650 500 4 150 50% 50%
August 7 248 856 8 104 3 620 430 4 050 50% 50%
September 4 135 186 4 321 2 070 90 2 160 50% 50%
October 2 741 313 3 054 1 370 160 1 530 50% 50%
November 4 043 101 4 144 2 020 50 2 070 50% 50%
December 2 877 41 2 918 1 440 20 1 460 50% 50%
Total 33 957 3 207 37 164 14 170 1 250 18 580 23 500 58% -21%
1944
January 4 479 200 4 679 3 584 100 3 684 20% 50%
February 2 154 25 2 179 1 724 10 1 734 20% 50%
March 1 997 317 2 314 1 597 160 1 757 20% 50%
April 2 643 280 2 923 2 115 140 2 255 20% 50%
May 399 176 575 319 90 409 20% 50%
June 838 46 884 671 20 691 20% 50%
July 3 875 417 4 292 2 335 210 2 545 40% 50%
August 4 373 257 4 630 2 625 130 2755 40% 50%
September 2 339 135 2 474 1 874 70 1 944 20% 50%
October 4 433 247 4 680 3 547 120 3 667 20% 50%
November 1 186 26 1 212 949 10 959 20% 50%
December 1 361 54 1 415 1 089 30 1 119 20% 50%
Total 30 077 2 180 32 257 22 429 1 090 23 519 23 700 36% -1%
1945
January 4500
February 4600
March 4300
Total 13 400 13 700 -2%

Battle of Kursk

The traditional Western narrative of the Battle of Kursk is that of vastly superior German tanks destroying scores of Soviet tanks at ranges of two to three kilometers before being overwhelmed and rammed to death by the Soviet masses. This version of the battle was written before Western authors had access to Soviet archives, and relied solely on German records. If used without any reservations it is clear how these records would give the impression that German tanks were superior to those of the Soviets.

Claims by selected German units during the Battle of Kursk.
Unit Vehicle Dates Claimed Kills Losses Claimed Ratio
Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503 45 Tigers 5 July to 17 August 385 7 55:1
13. Kompanie/SS-Panzer-Regiment 1 13 Tigers 5 July to 14 July 150 2 75:1
Schwere Panzerjäger-Regiment 656 89 Ferdinands 5 July to 27 July 502 39 12.9:1
Panzer-Regiment 39 200 Panthers 5 July to 17 July 263 58 4.5:1
Total 1300 106 12.3:1
Claims by all German Eastern Front units, 5 July to 31 August.
Total Claims
Reported by units 16 251
After 50 percent reduction 8 125
German total losses 1 331
Claimed ratio 12.2:1
Claimed ratio after reduction 6.1:1

It is no surprise that such claimed kill ratios would give the impression that the Battle of Kursk was a disaster for the Soviet tank forces, and that Germany came close to winning the battle. While the latter numbers include units outside the Kursk area, relatively little tank combat would have taken place on the other front sections. Even after the 50 percent reduction by the German High Command, however, the claims exceed the recorded Soviet losses.

Soviet tank and self-propelled gun strength and losses during the Battle of Kursk, including reserves, from 5 July to 31 August.
Operation Tank Strength Tank Losses
Zitadelle (German offensive) 5128 1614
Kutuzov (Soviet northern offensive) 3324 2586
Rumiantsev (Soviet southern offensive) 2439 1864
Total 7360 6064

The total strength is adjusted to account for double counting between the defensive and offensive operations. The losses include those tanks that were repaired after the battle. Despite that the German High Command's 50 percent reduction was supposed to account for those tanks that were repaired after the battle, the German High Command's reduced claims are still 34 percent higher than the actual losses before repaired Soviet tanks are subtracted.

In determining a ratio, it is also important to note that the German losses only include total write-offs, and not tanks that could be repaired. While no data is available specifically for the Kursk area from 5 July to 31 August, the numbers for the entire Eastern Front can be used on the assumption that the majority of the action took place within that area.

German combat-ready tanks on the Eastern Front from 5 July to 31 August.
Date Tanks Assault guns Total
5 July 1870 860 2730
10 July 1081 628 1709
20 July 910 575 1485
31 July 734 621 1355
10 August 745 542 1287
20 August 621 487 1108
31 August 494 524 1018
Difference between 5 July and 31 August 1376 336 1712

These numbers does not show how many reinforcement tanks were received. It also does not include those tanks repaired by field workshops. The decrease of 1712 tanks is therefore a very conservative estimate of German tank and assault gun losses comparable to Soviet losses. The actual ratio between the 6064 Soviet losses and the estimated 1712 German losses could therefore not have been greater than 3.5:1, and was likely significantly lower. This should be compared to the traditional claims of 12.2:1 if using the troop claims and 6.1:1 when using German High Command reduced claims. In other words, the overall German unit claims were at least four times as high as the actual losses.

Operation Goodwood

Operation Goodwood is often described as a tactical disaster for the British, resulting in the loss of upwards of 500 tanks. This in reinforced by those post-war authors who have only looked at the British overall losses, without examining the way the British counted those losses.

British Goodwood tank unit status from 17 July to 20 July. All numbers are for the end of the day. "CR" is combat ready tanks; "<24" is tanks repairable within 24 hours; ">24" is tanks not repairable within 24 hours.
Division Brigade 17 July 18 July 19 July 20 July
CR CR <24 >24 CR <24 >24 CR <24 >24
1st Corps
3rd Infantry Division 148th Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps 70 70 - - 70 - 1 70 N/A
27th Armoured Brigade 220 201 6 18 194 4 4 195 - -
2nd Canadian Corps 2nd Canadian Armoured Division 202 191 1 10 186 10 2 185 N/A
8th Corps
7th Armoured Division 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars 72 67 3 2 62 8 2 70 - -
22nd Armoured Brigade 216 198 10 8 191 11 4 199 12 3
11th Armoured Division 2nd Northhamptonshire Yeomanry 72 46 1 15 35 4 16 46 - 1
29th Armoured Brigade 214 91 13 115 96 12 16 132 5 9
Guards Armoured Division 2nd Welsh Guards 68 63 1 4 68 1 3 66 2 4
5th Guards Armoured Brigade 235 153 1 62 198 15 18 166 5 27
Total 1369 880 36 234 1000 65 66 1060 24 44

The British tank casualties for the Goodwood campaign is cited as 493, which is the sum of all tanks being repaired from 18 to 20 July for the above units plus an additional 24 tanks for the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade for 21 July. As is evident from the breakdown of the numbers, however, this is a summary of tanks that are not combat ready rather than write-offs. This includes those tanks that would have been repaired within 24 hours and therefore before the next strength status. All those tanks that were not repairable within 24 hours were of course not write-offs either; German status reports used a three week cut-off for short-term repairs rather than 24 hours, yet these tanks are not usually not counted as losses.

The number of write-offs is more difficult to ascertain, but the numbers for 11th Armoured Division and the Guards Armoured Division gives some idea.

Status of tanks not repairable by the field repair workshops for Operation Goodwood in 11th Armoured Division as of July and Guards Armoured Division as of September.
Status 11 Armoured Division Guards Armoured Division Total
Sherman Cromwell Stuarts and others Sherman Cromwell Stuarts and others
Not yet recovered 15 14 9 - 38
Undergoing recovery 13 6 - - 19
Undergoing repairs 23 4 7 49 - 1 84
Written off 26 2 2 15 - 1 46
Total 77 26 18 64 - 2 187

Even if it is assumed that the total number of tanks not yet recovered would be written off, the total number of lost tanks for 11th Armoured Division and Guards Armoured Division would be 103 tanks. Compared to the 350 tanks that are often considered casualties in post-war litterature for these two units, this is a considerable reduction.

The definition of a lost tank is important in this regard, as German kill claims during Goodwood are often considered accurate because they match the British losses. If the actual British losses are in fact only about one third of the frequently accepted numbers the German claims must therefore necessarily be inflated.

Among the claims of the German units is that the Panthers of I./SS-Panzer-Regiment 1/1. SS-Panzer-Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" destroyed 40 Shermans of the 23rd Hussars of 29th Armoured Brigade during their counter-attack on 18 July. On 18 July, however, 23rd Hussars only lost a total of 26 tanks, including those tanks that would since be brought back into action.

While Operation Goodwood might not have created the breakthrough that was planned, the total of about 150 British tanks written off compared to the 83 German tanks and assault guns written off is certainly not the disaster as which it is usually described.

British Tank Losses, 1944

During the fighting on the Western Front, Oberbefehlshaber West, the German command on the Western Front, compiled statistics on Allied personnel and equipment losses. The equipment statistics were seperated between British, American, and Other (usually French) equipment. Included in the British numbers were the tanks of the Canadian and Polish armored divisions.

Heeresgruppe (Army Group) B and H kill claims for British and Commonwealth tanks and armored vehicles from 16 June to 15 December 1944. 6 to 15 July and 6 to 25 September numbers are missing. American tanks in British service were reported as British tanks.
Date Range Army Group Tanks Armored Vehicles
16 June to 25 June B 104 18
26 June to 5 July B 528 18
16 July to 25 July B 546 43
26 July to 5 August B 279 24
6 August to 15 August B 478 -
16 August to 25 August B 110 -
26 August to 5 September B 44 -
26 September to 5 October B 174 45
6 October to 15 October B 56 47
16 October to 25 October B 179 47
26 October to 5 November B 195 23
6 November to 15 November B 5 1
H 4 3
16 November to 25 November B 23 -
H 17 5
26 November to 5 December B 1 -
H 9 3
6 December to 15 December B - -
H 11 -
Total - 2763 277

These numbers can be compared with the tank losses of the British 21st Army Group, which included the British Second Army and the Canadian First Army, which in turn included the Polish 1st Armoured Division.

21st Army Group tank losses, 6 June to 26 August 1944.
Type Knocked Out Written Off
Stuart 110 N/A
Sherman 1161 819
Cromwell 235 215
Churchill 161 177
Total 1667 1211

Whether comparing with the 1667 knocked-out tanks, which included tanks later repaired, or the 1211 tanks written off, it is clear that the German claim for the same period is inflated. Even though it does not cover the first ten days of fighting, which included the 179 British tanks written off for 6 June alone, German units claimed 2045 destroyed tanks. If compared to the number of tanks written off, taking into account that the claims does not cover the first ten days of fighting, the claimed number is close to twice the actual number. This makes the previously mentioned German High Command practice of dividing the claims by two to account for double-counting and repairable vehicles fairly accurate for this time frame.

Summary

As has been demonstrated above, the kill claims of German units cannot be trusted. When claims can exceed the actual losses by more than 300 percent, they cannot be considered credible as even a rough estimate of how many tanks the individual units destroyed. Thus, the number of kills attributed to German tanks aces and individual units must be considered as nothing more than the propaganda as which they were originally intended.

Unlike what is sometimes claimed when such conclusions are presented, this is not disrespectful to the veterans who made the claims; the notion that the truth and the pursuit thereof can ever be disrespectful is absurd, and a disservice to those who are actually interested in history.

Another common reaction is that the kill lists, while incorrect, is the only source available. While small engagements involving a limited number of tanks can sometimes be tracked with a high level of accuracy, it is true that there are usually no alternative source with which it can be estimated how many tanks each unit or tank ace destroyed. Using this fact to argue that the kill lists therefore have some merit is however a fallacy; in the absence of good sources, the correct response is not to use sources that are known to have serious errors, but rather to declare that we don't know and move on to other fields of study.

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